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In order to study the long-run e¤ects of agents’ heterogeneity we
consider overlapping generations of individuals who di¤er from one
another in wealth and ine¢ciency level. When young, agents choose
whether to invest or not in human capital. Since the net return of
human capital investment is positive, agents who can a¤ord such an
investment, do invest. In the second period of life, agents make an oc-
cupational choice. They choose to be workers or entrepreneurs. There
exists a critical level of ine¢ciency below which becoming entrepreneur
is pro…table. The wealth distribution and the occupational structure
of agents changes over time, the former being the cause and the ef-
fect of the latter. The long run wealth distribution is stationary and
can be either ergodic or not, with long-run occupational mobility or
not. We show how the economy’s structural parameters and the types
of intergenerational transmission of skills a¤ect the dynamic patterns
and the long-run equilibria.
¤Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli Studi di Milano - Bicocca P.zza
dell’Ateneo Nuovo, 1 20126 MILANO e-mail: riccarda.longaretti@unimib.it
1INTRODUCTION
“The study of income inequality - its causes, its consequences, and its poten-
tial policy implications - has a long history in economics, although it has not
always had a high pro…le among researchers and policymakers. To borrow
a phrase from Professor Atkinson, income distribution in recent years has
been «brought in from the cold».” (Alan Greenspan, opening speech at the
Symposium on “Income Inequality”, organized by Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City).
In neoclassical growth models, the assumptions of complete markets and
perfect competition lead to ergodic dynamics of income and wealth. There-
fore the long-run equilibrium does not depend on initial conditions and in-
come heterogeneity disappears, a conclusion which is clearly inconsistent with
the empirical evidence.
The endogenous growth literature has revived the interest of macroecono-
mists on the issue of income distribution. In fact, if the representative agent
hypothesis is abandoned in these models, heterogeneity persists because of
di¤erences in technologies, which agents have access to, or because of di¤er-
ent degrees in the rate of human capital accumulation.
Recent empirical analysis has emphasized a negative relation between
growth and inequality. Moreover, empirical evidence supports the view that
redistributive policies in many cases favorite growth.
Since the early 90’s, the New Growth literature has stimulated a rich
literature on the long-run e¤ects of inequality. Two channels have been
detected, which inequality and growth interact through.
The …rst is the political-economic channel, which interprets redistributive
policy as the result of a majority vote in order to choose a tax rate propor-
tional to capital income. Since voters bene…t equally from public spending
while pay in proportion to their capital income, the lower their tax base
relatively to the mean, the higher the tax rate they prefer. Therefore, the
more unequal the wealth distribution, the tighter the redistributive policy.
Taxation has anyway a disincentive e¤ect on capital accumulation, since it
reduces private return from capital, and gives rise to lower savings, invest-
ment and growth. Therefore, most of the models belonging to this literature
claim that the redistribution from capitalists to workers negatively a¤ects
growth.
The second channel, which inequality and growth interact through, is
based on the imperfection of capital markets. If investment decisions take
2place in a context of inequality and incomplete markets for capital there
exists the possibility that human and/or physical capital accumulation is not
e¢cient. This is due to di¤erences in investment opportunities which may
perpetuate inequality itself. Models belonging to this branch of literature
address the consequences of capital market imperfections for human capital
investment (Galor and Zeira 1993; Owen and Weil 1998; Benabou 1996a and
1996b), or for investment in …xed capital is developed (Banerjee and Newman
1993; Aghion and Bolton 1997; Piketty 1997; Bhattacharya 1998).
In this paper a model is developed which explores the long-run e¤ects
of income and wealth inequality via capital market imperfections a¤ecting
both human capital and physical capital investment. The results may, at
least in a way, interpret the di¤erent cross-countries dynamics of wealth
distribution as far as multiple equilibria are obtained. One country may
take o¤ and converge to a high level of wealth with the whole population
highly quali…ed, while another, because of its worse initial condition (highly
unequal wealth distribution and low average wealth), may be trapped into
poverty and into non quali…cation. Moreover the model may explain social
mobility, since changes in occupational classes may be both the cause and the
e¤ect of the accumulation. In particular the model can provide a rationale
for the familiar determinants of social mobility. Both the empirical and the
theoretical literature has stressed that these determinants are both genetic
and altruistic. The stronger these components, the more sons’ income and
wealth are related to fathers’ ones. Genetic components consists in the ability
to earn (productivity) inherited from fathers. Altruistic components make
sons’ income depending on fathers’ ones thanks to fathers’ investments in
sons’ education and upgrading. In the model developed in this paper, if
skills are inheritable and incomes are skill-dependent, sons’ income is related
to the fathers’ one. Analogously, the more fathers bequeath their sons, the
more sons’ income and wealth destiny is downward rigid, that is the worst
sons can do is to remain in their fathers’ income and wealth classes. In other
words a high altruism implies upward mobility between income, wealth and
occupational classes.
The model yelds di¤erent dynamic patterns (see section 3) according to
the economy’s structural parameters and to the transmission of entrepreneur-
ial skills, that is individual technical ine¢eciency. Individual ine¢ciency is
the sum of two components: the …rst one is genetic, resulting from the joint
in‡uence of genetics and familiar environment where potential entrepreneur
grows up. The second component is totally random, due to the joint action
3of Fortune and Nature. If the degree of inheritability of the ine¢ciency is
low, the dynamics of wealth accumulation is ergodic and long-run distribu-
tion does not depend on initial conditions. On the contrary, the higher the
genetic component, the more the dynamics is non-ergodic and may depend
or not on initial conditions. There may exist multiple equilibria.
1 ASSUMPTIONS
Let’s consider a closed economy, with two goods: the output good which can
be either consumed or invested and the capital good, which can be used only
in the production of the output good.
There exist overlapping generations of a countable in…nity of two-period
lived agents. Population is constant over time. Young agents are endowed
with one unit of labour and di¤er ex-ante from one another in their degree of
technical ine¢ciency (ºt) and wealth (bt), that is the bequest received from
their fathers. The cumulative distribution function of progenitors’ wealth
G(b) is exogenously given. G(b) represents the share of the population hav-
ing initial wealth lower or equal to b. I assume that wealth is uniformly
distributed among progenitors on the support (0;1):
The progenitors’ technical ine¢ciency is randomly assigned by Nature
according to a uniform distribution on (0;1). The degree of technical ine¢-
ciency istransmitted froma generation tothe other according tothe following
law of motion:
ºt+1 = ½ºt + (1 ¡ ½)ut+1 (1)
with 0 < ½ < 1 and ut+1~U (0;1). According to (1) each agents’ degree of
ine¢ciency is a linear combination of his father’s technical ine¢ciency and of
a random component whose realizations are extracted from a time-invariant
uniform distribution. ½ measures the degree of inheritability of technical in-
ne¢ciency.This implies that, only if technical ine¢ciency were a pure random
quality (½ = 0) or a pure genetic quality (½ = 1), each generation would be
characterized by the same distribution of abilities. The stochastic component
of technical ine¢ciency could be interpreted as the e¤ect of congenital skill
randomly chosen by Nature according to a time-invariant distribution.
1. Note that
E (ºt+1) = ½
t+1E (º0) +
³
1 + ½ + ::: + ½
t
´
(1 ¡ ½)E (ut+1)
4lim
t!+1 E (ºt+1) = 0:5
The higher the degree of inheritability of º, the more volatile the degree
of technical ine¢ciency from a generation to the other are greater. The
maximum oscillation is (1 ¡ ½). Therefore, the lower ½, the wider the
intergenerational oscillations in the degree of technical ine¢ciency, that
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Preferences are homogeneous among the population. The individual util-






where ct+1 represents individual consumption in the second period of life and
bt+1 represents the level of bequests left to each agent’s son.
In the …rst period of life, agents choose whether to save the whole inher-
itance, or to invest it (at least in part) in human capital. The investment
is indivisible and equal to h. Therefore agents face a binary (“all or noth-
ing”) choice.Assuming that agents cannot borrow to …nance education, poor
agents, with bt < h, are not able to undertake any kind of human capital
investment.
Education makes agents more e¢cient and more productive. The second-
period level of ine¢ciency (ºo) 1, is lower for agents who have undertaken
investment in education, while it remains the one assigned by Nature for
unskilled agents: ºo = º ¡ h =
(
º for h = 0
º ¡ h for h = h .
In the second period of life agents choose whetherto become entrepreneurs
or to supply their own endowment of labour. The marginal productivity of
skilled workers, exogenous and constant, is equal to w + ±h, and it is higher
than that of unskilled workers.: Labour is remunerated according to marginal
productivity. Therefore the wage rate at an exogenous and constant rate. In
1“o” stands for “old”.
5particular, the rate of reward of unskilled workers is w; and the rate of return
of skilled labour is w + ±h, where ±h is a sort of college premium.
Each agent is endowed with an entrepreneurial projectand therefore is a
potential entrepreneur. The more ine¢cient the agent, the lower the outcome
of his project. The undertaking of the investment project requires x units of
the output good as input and one unit of labour, the entrepreneur’sone.2 The
physical capital investment technology transforms period t output in period
t+1 capital. Each project outcome is negatively related to the entrepreneur’s
level of ine¢ciency according to the following equation:
kt+1 = ¹ K (1 ¡ º
o) =
( ¹ K (1 ¡ º) for h = 0
¹ K (1 ¡ º + h) for h = h
Technical ine¢ciency is an entrepreneurial characteristic, à la Bernanke
e Gertler (1989): the more an agent is technically ine¢cient, the lower the
outcome of his entrepreneurial investment project 3.
All the progenitors are all liquidity constrained, that is their wealth is
lower than the input requirement x. Therefore they cannot self …nance their
investment project and must ask for credit. The interest rate on loans is
exogenously given. The gross interest rate is i. Agents who do not become
entrepreneurs o¤er their labour endowment and invest their savings in the
capital market getting a return equal to i. The lending policy is accommo-
dating since the interest rate is exogenously …xed by the Central Bank and
lenders accommodate the demand for funds at that rate. This implicitly
means that there always exists excess supply of loanable fund.
At the end of the production process, in period t + 1, the entrepreneur
sells the capital good at the relative price q, exogenous and constant. The
gross return from the investment project (Á) is therefore
Á = q ¹ K (1 ¡ º
o)
Aggregate capital produced in the economy is used in the production of
the output good. Once the capital good is produced and sold, entrepre-
neurs/debtors must refund the loan they got. The entrepreneur’s pro…t is
therefore
¼t+1 = q ¹ K (1 ¡ º
o) ¡ i(x ¡ b
o
t)
2An entrepreneur can be interpreted as a self-employed worker à la Banerjee and
Newman.
3In Bernanke e Gertler (1989), the more an agent is ine¢cient, the higher the input
requirement he needs in order to invest.
6where bo
t, the individual wealth when old, is equal to bt if the agent has not
invested in education; to bt ¡ h if he has invested in education.
Given the hypotheses on wages and on pro…t, the marginal return from
education is constant and equal to ± for workers and it is equal to qK for
entrepreneurs. Capital depreciates completely in each period. Therefore,
in each period, aggregate capital is the sum of all the undertaken projects.
Inputs in the production of the output good are skilled (Lq) and unskilled
labour (Lnq) and capital (K). Given the hypotheses on factors rewards,
aggregate output is
Y = wLnq + (w + ±h)Lq + qK (3)
2 HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE
From the maximization of utility (2) subject to the budget constraint ct+1 +
bt+1 · yt+1 it is immediate to conclude that each agent bequeaths his son
with a share (1 ¡ °) of his second-period income (yt+1), while the residual
is consumed: bt+1 = (1 ¡ °)yt+1; ct+1 = °yt+1. The indirect utility function
therefore is linear in income:
u = °
(°) (1 ¡ °)
(1¡°) yt+1
Indirect utility maximization is therefore equivalent to income maximiza-
tion.
If a non-quali…ed agent chooses to become worker, his income is the sum
of the unskilled labour wage and the return on investment of his savings in
the capital market at the gross interest rate i. Therefore y
w;nq
t+1 = ibt + w 4.
Analogously a quali…ed worker’s income is: y
w;q
t+1 = i(bt ¡ h) + w + ±h. Net
return from education is therefore (± ¡ i)h, that is the college premium ±h
less the opportunity cost of education ih:
If a quali…ed agent chooses to become entrepreneur, his second-period
income is equal to the gross return on investment less the debt burden, i.e.
y
e;q
t+1 = q ¹ K (1 ¡ º + h)¡i(x¡ bt + h). A non-quali…ed entrepreneur’s income
4w stands for worker, nq stands for non-quali…ed. Symmetrycally, q stands for quali…ed,
e stands for entrepreneur.
7is y
e;nq
t+1 = q ¹ K (1 ¡ º) ¡ i(x ¡ bt) 5. Net return from education for entrepre-
neurs is
³
q ¹ K ¡ i
´
h, that is, as above, the gross return less the opportunity
cost of education.
Each agent, if su¢ciently rich to a¤ord education, …nds it e¤ectively
pro…table to invest in human capital. In fact I assume that the net marginal
return from education is positive both for entrepreneurs and for workers. The
net marginal return from education is positive if bene…ts (higher incomes)
are greater than costs (direct costs (h) and indirect costs (i)), i.e. ± > i and
q ¹ K > i.
Given the assumptions above, and because of the non-convexity of human
capital investment technology, educational choice depends only on the level
of initial individual wealth: all the agents who can self-…nance education
do invest in human capital. The quali…ed percentage of the population is
therefore [1 ¡ G(h)], since G(h) is the percentage of the population having
initial wealth lower than h. In particular, given the hypothesis according
to which progenitors’ wealth is uniformly distributed on the support (0;1),
the quali…ed percentage of the …rst generation is 1 ¡ h; whereas h is the
non-quali…ed progenitors’ share.
Given the interest rate, the wage, the relative price of capital and physical
capital investment technology, occupational choice exclusively depends on
the individual degree of technical ine¢ciency. Actually, given individual
preferences, it is pro…table to undertake the entrepreneurial project if and
only if entrepreneurial income is not lower than worker’s income.
A quali…ed agent chooses to become entrepreneur if his degree of techni-
cal ine¢ciency is lower or equal to a threshold level ¹ ºe;nq =
qK¡ix¡w
q ¹ K , with
(
¹ ºe;nq = 0 for qK < ix + w
0 · ¹ ºe;nq · 1 for qK ¸ ix + w
.
This threshold level is a decreasing function of the interest rate, of the
input requirement and of the unskilled labour wage, while it increases with
qK. The higher the interest rate, the input requirement and the wage and
the lower the gross return from investment per unit of e¢ciency qK, the
5Note that entrepreneurial income is formally the same either he is liquidity constrained
or not. Actually if he can self-…nance his project, he invests x in the project and the rest
(bt ¡h) in the capital market, at the gross interest rate i. The income of a self-…nanced
quali…ed entrepreneur is therefore y
e;q
t+1 = q ¹ K (1 ¡ º + h) + i(bt ¡ h ¡x): The income of
a self-…nanced non-quali…ed entrepreneur is y
e;nq
t+1 = q ¹ K (1 ¡º) + i(bt ¡x): The human
capital investment choice described below rules out the existence of a fully collateralized
non-quali…ed entrepreneur anyways.
8less pro…table is entrepreneurship relatively to becoming a worker. Because
of the hypothesis according to which progenitors’ entrepreneurial technical
ine¢ciency is uniformly distributed on (0;1), the percentage of non-quali…ed
progenitors who decide to become entrepreneurs is ¹ ºe;nq. Equivalently, the
percentage of non-quali…ed progenitors becoming workers is 1 ¡ ¹ ºe;nq:
Analogously, it is easy to demonstrate that a quali…ed agent …nds it
pro…table to become entrepreneur if and only if he is characterized by a
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Also in this case the threshold level of ine¢ciency is a decreasing function
of the interest rate and of the input requirement, while it is an increasing





and the gross return from education for workers (±h).
The quali…ed threshold degree of ine¢ciency is higher than the non-
quali…ed threshold level. Actually, if an individual is non-quali…ed, he be-
comes entrepreneur if his degree of ine¢ciency is lower than ¹ ºe;nq; education
implies an increase in wage equal to the college premium ±h; which would de-
crease entrepreneurial pro…tability. Anyway education increases also pro…t,
and the pro…t enhancement qKh is greater than wage enhancement ±h. In
other words the gross return from human capital investment is higher for en-
trepreneurs than for workers. The net e¤ect of education is therefore a higher
pro…tability of undertaking the entrepreneurial investment. The threshold
degree of ine¢ciency is therefore higher for educated agents. Formally







A poor agents who cannot a¤ord human capital investment may …nd it prof-
itable to undertake the investment project, but he has to be naturally more
e¢cient than a rich/quali…ed agent.
Since wealth and technical ine¢ciency are stochastically independent,
the percentage of quali…ed workers among progenitors is (1 ¡ h)¹ ºe;q: Non-
quali…ed entrepreneurs are instead the h¹ ºe;nq percent. The percentage of
quali…ed workers is (1 ¡ h)(1 ¡ ¹ ºe;q) and …nally non-quali…ed workers are
the h(1 ¡ ¹ ºe;nq) percent of progenitors.
9Progenitors are distributed as in Table 1 according to education and oc-
cupation.
NQ. Q marg. distr.
W h(1 ¡ ¹ ºe;nq) (1 ¡ h)(1 ¡ ¹ ºe;q) 1 ¡ (1 ¡ h)¹ ºe;q ¡ h¹ ºe;nq
E h¹ ºe;nq (1 ¡ h)¹ ºe;q h¹ ºe;nq + (1 ¡ h)¹ ºe;q
marg. distr. h 1 ¡ h 1
Table 1: progenitors’ occupational distribution.
3 DYNAMICS ...
The long-run e¤ects of inequality depend on the hypothesis about the in-
tergenerational transmission of technical ine¢ciency. In particular, if the
transmission of entrepreneurial ability is due only to genetics (i.e. it is un-
a¤ected by stochastic shocks), dynamics are determined exclusively by each
progenitor’s characteristics (wealth and technical ine¢ciency), the long-run
distribution of wealth is strictly dependent on initial conditions and there
exist multiple equilibria. On the other hand, if technical ine¢ciency has a
stochastic component the dynamics of accumulation of wealth are a Markov
Process. The lower the genetics, the higher the probability, for each genera-
tion, to converge to any steady state. The long-run distribution is ergodic.
Each panel of …gure 1 sketches the accumulation functions for each kind
of progenitor: non-quali…ed worker, quali…ed worker, non-quali…ed entrepre-
neur, quali…ed entrepreneur.
Given preferences and human capital investment, the law of motion of a
non-quali…ed worker’s wealth is:
bt+1 = (1 ¡ °)(ibt + w)
(
bt 2 (0;h)
ºe;nq < ºt · 1 (5)
The law of motion of a quali…ed worker’s wealth is instead:
bt+1 = (1 ¡ °)[i(bt ¡ h) + w + ±h]
(
bt 2 (h;x)
ºe;q < ºt · 1 (6)
If the progenitor is a non-quali…ed entrepreneur, the dynasty accumulates
wealth according to the following equation:
10bt+1 = (1 ¡ °)
h
q ¹ K (1 ¡ ºt) ¡ i(x ¡ bt)
i (
bt 2 (0;h)
0 · ºt · ºe;nq
(7)
This equation and the corresponding function is parametrized to the en-
trepreneur’s level of technical ine¢ciency, since that is a pure entrepreneurial
quality.
Finally a quali…ed entrepreneur’s dynasty accumulates wealth according
to the following equation:
bt+1 = (1 ¡ °)
h
q ¹ K (1 ¡ ºt + h) ¡ i(x ¡ bt + h)
i (
bt 2 (h;x)
0 · ºt · ºe;q
(8)
Also in this case each function is parametrized to a speci…c level of tech-
nical ine¢ciency.
The economy’s structural parameters determine di¤erent long-run sce-
narios (see …gures 1). Each scenario corresponds to di¤erent occupational
structure of the population in each generation.
The transmission mechanism of technical ine¢ciency …nally a¤ects the
evolution of the distribution of income and wealth and the evolution of the
occupational structure of the population.
11(I) (II)
(III) (IV)
Figure 1: the four possible dynamics of wealth accumulation
according to the economy’s structural parameters.









which give rise to the following values for key variables in the model:
Values
w + ±h 4
ºe;q 0:733
ºe;nq 0:233
Therefore, non-quali…ed workers are 53.66% of progenitors, non-quali…ed
entrepreneurs 16.33%, quali…ed workers 21.99%. The quali…ed percentage of
the population is 3%. Most of the agents are therefore non-quali…ed workers
and most of the quali…ed agents are entrepreneurs.
The second scenario is the result, ceteris paribus, of a decrease in the cost
of education, which implies a decrease of quali…ed entrepreneurs’ pro…t and
of quali…ed workers’ wage. Vice versa the decrease in the cost of education
implies an increase in the threshold level of ine¢ciency. Analogously the
share of entrepreneurs among quali…ed people increases. The parameters














The reduction of the cost of education implies a reduction of the non-
quali…ed share of the population. 11.66% of the population consists of non-
quali…ed entrepreneurs, non-quali…ed workers are 38.33%. Quali…ed workers
are instead 20.5%and quali…ed entrepreneurs 29,5%. The decrease in the cost
of education has therefore determined an increase of the quali…ed percentage
of the population and a reduction of the disproportion among occupational
classes. In particular there has been an increase in the share of quali…ed
workers.
The third scenario could derive from a simultaneous increase in the cost














Liquidity constraints strengthen because of the increase in the cost of edu-
cation and are an obstacle for the 90% of progenitors. 20.99% of progenitors
consists of non-quali…ed entrepreneurs and 69% are non-quali…ed workers,
8.76% is instead made of quali…ed entrepreneurs and …nally 1.239% is com-
posed by quali…ed workers.
The last possible scenario could …nally be brought about by a further










which gives rise to:
Values
w + ±h 4:857
ºeq 0:5704
ºenq 0:00433
The reduction of the gross return per unit of e¢ciency implies a decrease
of the pro…tability of entrepreneurship. Actually quali…ed entrepreneurs are
5.7%, while non-quali…ed entrepreneurs are 0.39% of the population. Non-
quali…ed workers are 89.6% and quali…ed workers are 4.3% of progenitors.
Table 2 summarizes the occupational structure of progenitors in each
scenario
I II III IV
W,NQ 0.5366 0.3833 0.69 0.896
E,NQ 0.1633 0.1166 0.2099 0.0039
W,Q 0.08 0.205 0.01239 0.0426
E,Q 0.2199 0.295 0.0876 0.057
Table 2: progenitors’ occupational structure.
3.1 ... WHEN TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY IS EX-
CLUSIVELY GENETIC (½ = 1)
I start analyzing the wealth accumulation dynamics and long-run equilib-
ria when technical ine¢ciency is exclusively genetic. This implies ½ = 1 in
equation 1. In this case the wealth accumulation process is deterministic
and exclusively determined by progenitors’ characteristics (degree of ine¢-
ciency and wealth). Graphically it means that a dynasty accumulates wealth
according to a unique accumulation function.
15The long-run distribution of wealth, in each scenario, is represented in
…gure 2.
With parameters which give rise to scenario I, a non-quali…ed worker’s
dynasty remains in this category because it cannot accumulate su¢cient
wealth to a¤ord education. The descendants from a non-quali…ed workers
do not change occupation and converge to the steady state wealth (bw;nq)
¤ =
(1¡°)w







Figure 2: long run distribution of wealth in each scenario.
16Also dynasties descending from quali…ed workers and quali…ed entrepre-
neurs do not experience occupational mobility. Descendants from a quali…ed
worker converge to (bw;q)
¤ =
(1¡°)(w+±h¡ih)
1¡(1¡°)i = 2:25. Descendants from a
quali…ed entrepreneur converge to a steady state which is parametrized to




The less ine¢cient the dynasty, the higher the steady state wealth: (be;q)
¤ 2
(2:25;9:83].
The dynamics of the dynasty coming from non-quali…ed entrepreneur
are a little bit more complex. In this case dynasties characterized by a
level of ine¢ciency lower than e º = 1 ¡
i(x¡b)(1¡°)¡h
qK(1¡°) = 0:23233 succeed in
accumulating enough wealth in order to invest in human capital. They
become quali…ed entrepreneurs, whereas dynasties characterized by a de-




1¡(1¡°)i and remain non-quali…ed. Even in this
case, the higher the degree of ine¢ciency, the lower steady state wealth:
(be;nq)
¤ 2 [0:69;0:7).
The evolution of the occupational structure of the population is summa-
rized in table 2-3: in the long-run 54% of the population do not invest in
education. 53.66% of the population consists of unskilled workers. The re-
maining 46% of the population is quali…ed. The major share of the quali…ed
population is made of entrepreneurs: they are 38.26%of the population. Only
entrepreneurs experiment occupational mobility: 16.26% of non-quali…ed en-
trepreneurs become quali…ed entrepreneurs.
NQ Q marg. distr.
W 0:5366 ! 0:5366 0:08 ! 0:08 0:6166 ! 0:6166
E 0:1633 ! 0:0007 0:22 ! 0:382633 0:3833 ! 0:3833
marg. distr. 0:7 ! 0:5373 0:3 ! 0:462633 1
GINI 0:263 ! 0:367
Table 3: evolution of occupational distribution in scenario I (progenitors !long-run).
Average wealth increases, from 0.5 to 2.86, thanks to the increase of the
quali…ed entrepreneurial share of the population6.
6Average wealth is also an indicator of aggregate utility. Actually, given preferences,
aggregate utility is an increasing function of aggregate income. If population is constant,
aggregate utility is also an increasing function of average income and wealth.
17Concentration of wealth increases as well. The Gini coe¢cient goes from
0.263 to 0.367. This is due to the fact that the majority of the population
is trapped in a low level of wealth, which does not allow them to under-
take human capital investment. Only few dynasties (16.26%) can get out of
non-quali…cation and poverty and go up the income and education ladder
accumulating more wealth and increasing concentration.
As for scenario II, we obtain the following dynamics: quali…ed dynasties
remain in the same educational and occupational categories of their progen-
itors. Descendants from non-quali…ed entrepreneurs accumulate wealth and
undertake human capital investment, becoming, in the long-run, quali…ed en-
trepreneurs. Some of the descendantsfromnon-quali…ed workers((ºeq ¡ ºenq)
share of the non-quali…ed population, that is 18% of the whole population)
become quali…ed workers, the others become quali…ed entrepreneurs. Actu-
ally all the non-quali…ed workers may a¤ord education in the long-run but
some of them are su¢ciently e¢cient to …nd it pro…table to become entre-
preneurs when quali…ed. In the long-run the whole population is quali…ed.
Table 4 summarizes occupational distribution in this case.
NQ Q marg. distr.
W 0:3833 ! 0 0:20475 ! 0:4095 0:58805 ! 0:4095
E 0:1166 ! 0 0:29525 ! 0:5905 0:41185 ! 0:5905
marg. distr. 0:5 ! 0 0:5 ! 1 1
GINI 0:263 ! 0:25
Table 4: evolution of the occupational distribution in scenario II (progenitors !long-run).
Relatively to scenario I, the reduction of the cost of education has im-
plied the possibility, for all the dynasties, to become educated. Anyway h
represents human capital itself, and its reduction implies also a lower accu-
mulation of wealth for educated people. Actually, in this scenario, quali…ed
workers converge to 1:805. The set of steady states for quali…ed entrepreneurs
is instead (1:805;7:914], while it was (2:25;9:83] in scenario I.
Long-run distribution of wealth is sketched in …gure 2-4 (II). In this case,
the possibility for the entire population to become educated determines an
increase in the mean wealth (3:6) and a decrease in the concentration (Gini
coe¢cient becomes 0.25).
Summing up, we can state the following:
² when the transmission of technical ine¢ciency is genetic there may
exist multiple equilibria. The higher the liquidity constrained share of
18the progenitors, the higher the long-run share of the population trapped
in poverty and in non-quali…cation;
² a reduction in the cost of education, ceteris paribus, implies an increase
in equity and in aggregate e¢ciency, allowing the whole population to
qualify and implying an increase in the mean wealth and in aggregate
utility. In that case the long-run distribution does not depend on initial
conditions;
² ceteris paribus, the most e¢cient dynasties would be worse o¤ due to
the reduction in the cost of education, which means a decrease in human
capital and a decrease in quali…ed people’s income.
Multiple equilibria resulting from the …rst scenario are the same as Galor
and Zeira’s and Owen and Weil’s, and can interpret di¤erent cross-countries
dynamics in the distribution of income and wealth. In fact di¤erent cross-
country performances may be explained by di¤erent initial conditions. A
country characterized by a more equal distribution and a higher level of
average wealth may take o¤ and converge to a high long run equilibrium,
whereas a country with a very unequal distribution and a low level of average
wealth would inevitably be trapped in poverty and non-quali…cation.
As far as scenario III is concerned, descendants from non-quali…ed work-
ers and entrepreneurs remain in the progenitors’ educational and occupa-
tional categories. Only quali…ed entrepreneurs characterized by technical
ine¢ciency lower than e e º = (1 + h) ¡
ix(1¡°)+h
qK(1¡°) remain in this category. En-
trepreneurs with a degree of ine¢ciency such that e e º < º · ºeq decumulate
wealth and cannot a¤ord education anymore in the long-run, becoming non-
quali…ed workers. Dynasties descending from quali…ed workers experience
only downward mobility as far as education is concerned.
The long-run occupational distribution is summarized in Table 5.
NQ Q marg. distr.
W 0:69 ! 0:73 0:01238 ! 0 0:70238 ! 0:73
E 0:21 ! 0:21 0:08762 ! 0:06 0:29762 ! 0:27
marg. distr. 0:9 ! 0:94 0:1 ! 0:06 1
GINI 0:263 ! 0:332
Table 5: evolution of occupational distribution in scenario III (progenitors !long-run).
19In this case, in the long-run, only 6% of the population is quali…ed and
consists only of entrepreneurs. Generation after generation, 4% of the popu-
lation decumulates wealth and cannot a¤ord human capital investment any-
more. 2.7% of them moves downward along the occupational ladder. The
remaining 1.3% moves downwards only between educational classes.
Descendants from non-quali…ed people do not change either occupational,
or educational class.
Workers’ dynasties converge to (bw;nq)
¤ = 0:111732.
Non-quali…ed entrepreneurs’ dynasties converge to the set of steady states
(be;nq)
¤ 2 (0:111732;0:5028], parametrized toeach dynasty’sdegree of ine¢ciency:
Quali…ed entrepreneurs’ dynasties, with a degree of ine¢ciency lower than
0.6, converge to (be;q)
¤ 2 (0:9;1:9056).
The long-run distribution of wealth is sketched in Figure 2 (III). Liquidity
constraints for the majority of the population, due to the increase in the cost
of education, become binding during the accumulation process because of
the low individual altruism. The increase in the cost of education and in the
individual egoism forces the great majority of the population into poverty
and non-quali…cation. In other words the increase in the quali…ed people’s
income due to the increase in h does not o¤set the cost of education itself
and the low share of individual income left as bequests.
Long-run average wealth is 0.23 and the long-run distribution of wealth
is more concentrated (Gini coe¢cient is 0.332).
In the last long-run scenario the whole population is trapped in poverty
and non-quali…cation. In this case non-quali…ed progenitors’ dynasties do
not change educational and occupational class. Descendants from quali…ed
workers become non-quali…ed workers while some descendants from quali-
…ed entrepreneurs remain entrepreneurs, but they do not qualify anymore.
The others move downward along educational and occupational classes: they
become non-quali…ed workers. These are characterized by a degree of tech-
nical ine¢ciency which guarantees the pro…tability of entrepreneurship only
if they qualify, when they fall into non-quali…cation they are not enough ef-
…cient to …nd it still pro…table to undertake the entrepreneurial investment
project. They are 9.9567% of the population. 4.33% of the population exper-
iments only downward mobility between educational classes. In the long-run
99:567% of the population is composed by non-quali…ed workers, 0.433%
consists of non-quali…ed entrepreneurs. Moreover the very high egoism re-
duces income dispersion and long-run wealth distribution almost collapses to
a single steady state (see …gure 2-4 (IV)). Actually the set of steady states
20is [0:010106;0:01061]:
Table 6 summarizes long-run occupational distribution in this last sce-
nario.
NQ Q marg. distr.
W 0:896103 ! 0:99567 0:04296 ! 0 0:939063 ! 0:99567
E 0:003897 ! 0:00433 0:05704 ! 0 0:060937 ! 0:00433
marg. distr. 0:9 ! 1 0:1 ! 0 1
GINI 0:263 ! 0
Table 6: evolution of occupational distribution in scenario IV (progenitors !long-run).
It is therefore possible to state the following:
² the decrease of individual altruism forces a very high share of the pop-
ulation to poverty and non-quali…cation. This condemnation is higher,
the more the progenitors cannot a¤ord human capital investment;
² for su¢ciently high egoism and low levels of gross return per e¢ciency
unit, the whole population, independently from initial conditions, al-
most collapses to a unique occupation (non-quali…ed workers) and wealth.
These results can provide a rationale for the familiar determinants of
social mobility. Both the empirical and the theoretical literature has stressed
that these determinants are both genetic and altruistic. The stronger these
components, the more sons’ income and wealth are related to fathers’ ones.
Genetic components consists in the ability to earn (productivity) inherited
from fathers. Altruistic components make sons’ income depending on fathers’
ones thanks to fathers’ investments in sons’ education and upgrading. In the
model developed in this paper, if skills are inheritable and incomes are skill-
dependent, sons’ income is related to the fathers’ one. Analogously, the
more fathers bequeath their sons, the more sons’ income and wealth destiny
is downward rigid. The worst sons can perform is to remain in their fathers’
income and wealth classes. In other words a high altruism implies upward
mobility between income, wealth and occupational classes.
The perfect inheritability of technical ine¢ciency therefore can give rise to
long-run distributions of wealth which are either strictly dependent on initial
conditions or not, according to the con…guration of structural parameters.
213.2 ... WHEN TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY IS EX-
CLUSIVELY STOCHASTIC (½ = 0)
If the degree of technical ine¢ciency is stochastic, wealth accumulation is a
Markov Process. The set of states can be decomposed in a set of transient
states and in an irreducible and closed set of persistent states. Once the
Markov Chain visits one persistent state, it remains in that class of states and
does not abandon it anymore. In the long-run transient states disappears and
the state space coincides with the closed and irreducible set of states. Each
dynasty visits each of the persistent state with a positive probability. All
the long-run states are therefore non-null persistent states and the long-run
distribution of wealth is unique, stationary and ergodic, independent from
initial conditions. Each dynasty may move among wealth classes without
implying any change in the mean wealth.
The long-run distribution of wealth for each scenario is represented in
…gure 3. This is the result of a numeric simulation based on the parameters
said above. I have plotted the distribution of wealth of 1500 dynasties after
200 periods.
The support and the …rst moment of the distributions, when parameters
give rise to the II and IV scenarios, do not change relatively to the perfect
genetic case. The only di¤erence is that in the long-run there exists occupa-
tional mobility. Each family does not converge to a unique steady state, but
moves among states. The absence of the familiar determinant of intergen-
erational occupational and income persistence determines an extreme social
‡uidity.
Summing up:
² when the transmission of technical ine¢ciency is stochastic, the long-
run distribution of wealth is ergodic. Each dynasty visits with a posi-
tive probability each steady state. The long-run distribution is unique
and stationary, but each family moves among occupational and wealth
classes;
² in scenarios II and IV, when, in the genetic transmission case, the
long-run distribution of wealth does not depend on initial condition, the







Figure 1: Figure 3: long run distribution of wealth.
23modify the long-run occupational structure, the support of the long-run
distribution and the long-run average and aggregate income and wealth.
Things changes in scenarios I and III. In scenario I, the closed and irre-








In the long-run all the people are quali…ed and long-run average wealth in-
creases with respect to the genetic transmission hypothesis. It goes from
2.863 to 5.05. Moreover wealth concentration decreases: the Gini coe¢cient
becomes 0.1759.
The fact that technical ine¢ciency is purely stochastic, opens up a way
out of poverty and non-quali…cation to the sons of non-quali…ed agents. In
the long-run the whole population is quali…ed and the great majority consists
of entrepreneurs (73% of the population). Anyway entrepreneurs are not al-
ways belonging to the same dynasties, since there always exists occupational
mobility. Table 7 summarizes the evolution of the occupational distribution
in this case.
NQ Q marg. distr.
W 0:5366 ! 0 0:08 ! 0:2666 0:6166 ! 0:2666
E 0:1633 ! 0 0:22 ! 0:7333 0:3833 ! 0:7333
marg. distr. 0:7 ! 0 0:3 ! 1 1
GINI 0:263 ! 0:1759
Table 7: evolution of occupational distribution in scenario I (progenitors !long-run)
Therefore the stochastic transmission of technical ine¢ciency brings about
the possibility of social climbing. In the long-run the whole population is
quali…ed.
In scenario III the situation is symmetric: in the long-run the whole
population is trapped in poverty and in non-quali…cation and distributed
on the support [0:111732;0:5028]. Most of the people are workers (76.66%).
The mean wealth is lower (0.156). The long-run occupational distribution is
summarized in Table 8.
NQ Q marg. distr.
W 0:69 ! 0:7666 0:01238 ! 0 0:70238 ! 0:7666
E 0:21 ! 0:2333 0:08762 ! 0 0:29762 ! 0:2333
marg. distr. 0:9 ! 1 0:1 ! 0 1
GINI 0:263 ! 0:1993
Table 8:evolution of occupational distribution in scenario III (progenitors !long-run)
24In other words the pure stochasticity of technical ine¢ciency can be a
condemnation for dynasties who, sooner or later, even if descending from a
very e¢cient progenitor, are trapped in poverty and non-quali…cation.
Concluding, the perfect stochasticity hypothesis makes ergodic long-run
distribution of wealth and, according to the economy’s structural parameters,
can be either a way out or a condemnation to poverty and non-quali…cation.
The evolution of occupational structure, the support of the long-run dis-
tribution, the mean wealth and the Gini coe¢cient for each scenario are
summarized in the following table:
25I II III IV
W,NQ 0:5366 0:3833 0:69 0:896103
E,NQ 0:1633 0:1166 0:21 0:003897
W,Q 0:08 0:20475 0:01238 0:04296
Progen. E,Q 0:22 0:29525 0:08762 0:05704
supp. [0;1] [0;1] [0;1] [0;1]
mean 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5
Gini 0:263 0:263 0:263 0:263
W,NQ 0:5366 0 0:73 0:99567
E,NQ 0:0007 0 0:21 0:00433
W,Q 0:08 0:4095 0 0






mean 2:863 3:6 0:23 0:010107
Gini 0:367 0:25 0:332 0
W,NQ 0 0 0:766 0:99567
E,NQ 0 0 0:233 0:00433
W,Q 0:266 0:4095 0 0
½ = 0 E,Q 0:733 0:5905 0 0
supp. [2:25;9:83] [1:805;7:914] [0:111;0:503] [0:0101;0:0106]
mean 5:05 3:6 0:156 0:010107
Gini 0:1759 0:1993 0:231863 0
Table 9
263.3 ... WHEN 0 < ½ < 1
I have run simulations for the intermediate case in which technical ine¢ciency
is neither totally genetic nor totally stochastic, in other words under the
hypothesis that 0 < ½ < 1.
Figure 4 sketches the results of the dynamics of a single dynasty’s wealth
over 100 period, for di¤erent values of persistence. Panel (a) is obtained with
½ = 0:5; panel (b) with ½ = 0:9 and panel (c) with ½ = 0:0001:
Only when entrepreneurial skills are highly inheritable the dynasty does
not qualify and converges to 0.69, that is to the steady state wealth of non-
quali…ed workers.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: wealth accumulation dynamics for a single dynasty over
100 periods.
I have also run numerical simulations for 1500 dynasties over 200 periods.
The distribution of wealth after 200 periods, in each scenario, is sketched in
…gure 5. Panels I (b), II, III (b) and IV are based on ½ = 0:5: Panels I (a) and
III (a) instead are based on ½ = 0:9: Comparing panels I (a) and I (b) and
comparing III (a) and III (b), we can easily notice that, the higher the degree
of skills inheritability, i.e. the greater½; the more plausible multiple equilibria
are and the dynamics are similar to the perfect genetic case (½ = 1):
27When ½ = 0:5; The dynamics and the long-run scenarios are similar to
the perfect stochastic case.
Moreover the higher ½, the fewer the non-null persistent steady states and
therefore the long-run distribution is no more ergodic. In other words, the
higher the persistence among generations, the lower the social mobility.
Summarizing, when the level of technical ine¢ciency is determined both by
genetics and by Nature, the long-run distribution is strictly dependent on the
degree of persistence: the more the skills are inheritable, the more plausible
are multiple equilibria and non-ergodic distributions.
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Figure 2: Figure 5: long run distribution of wealth when 0 < ½ < 1:
29CONCLUSIONS
In this paper a model has been developed which explores the long-run e¤ects
of income and wealth inequality via capital market imperfections a¤ecting
both human capital and physical capital investment. The dynamic patterns
are di¤erent according to the economy’s structural parameters and according
to types of intergenerational transmission of the technical ine¢ciency. Dy-
namics can be either ergodic or non-ergodic, with long-run social mobility
or immobility. The higher the inheritability of entrepreneurial skills and the
higher the individual altruism, the more plausible intergenerational income
and wealth persistence. Sons’ occupation, wealth and income are non-lower
than fathers’ ones. In this case multiple equilibria are possible and there-
fore long-run distribution may depend on initial conditions: the higher the
non-quali…ed share of progenitors, the higher the long-run share of popula-
tion which is trapped into poverty and non-quali…cation. The decrease of
individual altruism forces a greater share of the population into poverty and
non-quali…cation. Moreover, for particular economy’s structural parameters,
the whole population almost converges to unique occupation (non-quali…ed
workers) and to a unique low wealth in the long-run, whatever the technical
ine¢ciency transmission hypothesis.
If technical ine¢ciency has also a stochastic component, there always
exists social mobility. Long run distributions may be ergodic or not. The
total stochasticity of technical ine¢ciency may either be a way out or a con-
demnation to poverty and to non-quali…cation, according to the economy’s
structural parameters.
The results may give a rationale for di¤erent cross-countries dynamics of
wealth distribution as far as multiple equilibria are obtained. One country
may converge to a high level of wealth with the whole population highly
quali…ed, while another, because of its worse initial condition (highly unequal
wealth distribution and low average wealth), may be trapped into poverty
and into non quali…cation. Moreover the model may explain social mobility,
since changes in occupational classes may be both the cause and the e¤ect
of the accumulation. In particular the model can provide a rationale for the
familiar determinants of social mobility. If skills are inheritable and incomes
are skill-dependent, sons’ income is related to the fathers’ one. Analogously,
the more fathers bequeath their sons, the more sons’ income and wealth
destiny is downward rigid. In other words a high altruism implies upward
mobility between income, wealth and occupational classes.
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